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In the Pacific Economic Bulletin’s ‘Policy 
dialogue’ section (Kaufmann 2009), I argued 
that trade liberalisation is a necessity if 
Pacific island countries wish to enjoy the 
benefits that integration with the world 
economy can bring. I outlined the antagonis-
tic view towards trade liberalisation of many 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
such as the Pacific Network on Globalisation 
(PANG). In particular, I discussed that most 
often raised topic—namely, the loss of tariff 
revenue. I argued that although the loss of 
tariff revenue from the reduction of tariffs 
is an important issue, the revenue loss can 
be offset relatively easily by reforming the 
financial and fiscal structures of the island 
states. The article discussed the introduction 
of a value-added tax (VAT) and concluded 
that, if implemented wisely, a VAT can be 
effective in offsetting the tariff revenue loss.
In response, Maureen Penjueli and Wesley 
Morgan (2010) from PANG voiced their 
opposition to a Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus 
agreement involving a preferential trade 
agreement between the Pacific island 
countries and Australia and New Zealand 
in an article titled ‘Putting development 
first: concerns about a Pacific free trade 
agreement’. These authors argued that 
Pacific trade liberalisation would have 
serious negative revenue consequences and 
would not lead to consumer gains for Pacific 
islanders. Penjueli and Morgan proposed 
an alternative in the form of a so-called 
‘SPARTECA Plus’ (South Pacific Regional 
Trade and Economic Cooperation Agree-
ment). ‘SPARTECA Plus’ would involve the 
continuation of non-reciprocal, preferential 
trade between the Pacific island countries 
and Australia and New Zealand and the 
rejection of tariff reductions by the Pacific 
island countries.
What the authors did not do, however, 
was answer the crucial questions of trade 
liberalisation that I had posed. I would 
like to pose them again: who pays for the 
more expensive imports as the result of the 
imposition of tariffs or non-tariff barriers 
on imports? Would it not be a good idea 
for consumers to pay less for higher-quality 
goods and have more disposable income for 
other goods and services?
As has become so clear from the recent 
reform of telecommunication markets in the 
Pacific, local enterprises that do not have to 
worry about competition have no incentive 
to invest in improved production techniques 
or produce better-quality, lower-cost, more 
consumer-friendly products. Would not the 
additional disposable consumer income 
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resulting from the lower prices of imports 
following tariff reductions increase business 
opportunities for Pacific Islanders—not only 
for domestic industries, but for those who 
distribute the imports?
To all these questions—which should be 
key issues in an honest discussion of trade 
liberalisation in the Pacific—the response 
was the typical one of how ‘dangerous and 
wholly unnecessary’ a free-trade agreement 
with Australia and New Zealand would 
be. Penjueli and Morgan (2010) argued that 
‘the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations (PACER) was not designed to 
ensure cheaper goods for Pacific islanders 
or address constraints faced by Pacific 
businesses’, but instead is ‘a defensive 
mechanism’ for ‘Australian and New Zea-
land exporters and investors’.
Additionally, the authors portray 
Manjula Luthria, senior economist with the 
World Bank, as an opponent of a free-trade 
agreement between the Pacific island coun-
tries and Australia and New Zealand. This 
was done by presenting Luthria’s concerns 
over potential tariff revenue losses as well as 
her thoughts on the implementation of free-
trade agreements. Luthria (2009) writes that 
the ‘pain’ arising from a reciprocal, prefer-
ential trade agreement could be permanent: 
‘This is where the stark reality of many small 
states facing preference erosion will need to 
be faced in bilateral, regional and ultimately 
multilateral trade liberalisation fora. For 
many small states this pain is permanent, 
because they simply do not have the size 
and location advantages to operationalise 
their comparative advantage.’
The authors did not, however, present 
the other side of the story. Luthria, in the 
next sentence, states that ‘recent emphasis 
on economic geography has also shown that 
efforts to push economic activity out from 
hubs to the periphery either through con-
ventional policy prescriptions or through 
aid to build state capacity are fraught with 
failure. Instead, small states would do 
better by attempting to become economic 
extensions of their nearest large market.’ 
And ‘this is best achieved by reducing any 
economic “frictions” that create economic 
barriers between the islands (the periphery) 
and the nearest hubs—be they barriers of 
language, transport costs, costs of telephony, 
or trade tariffs’.
With regard to tariff reductions, Luthria 
has some clear advice
Tariff reductions on imports from 
Australia and New Zealand (ANZ)—
who are the main suppliers of imports 
into the Pacific—can significantly 
increase the welfare of Pacific denizens. 
This is primarily because it is already 
very expensive to get goods to the 
Pacific doorstep due to their small 
size and extreme remoteness. Adding 
on tariffs, which result in increasing 
the final price of goods to Pacific 
consumers, is akin to the islanders 
being shot in the foot twice, once by 
geographical distance and a second 
time through protectionist policies. 
(Luthria 2009)
I agree with Luthria and urge readers to 
read her opinion piece in full.
The rest of this article is structured 
as follows. In the next section, there is an 
update and revision of statistics relating 
to government revenues. Next, there is 
a review of the claim by Penjueli and 
Morgan (2010) that Tonga and Samoa have 
experienced serious revenue shortfalls after 
lowering tariffs and implementing a VAT. 
The following section is a discussion of the 
importance of the recognition of non-tariff 
barriers to trade and the consequences of a 
non-reciprocal ‘SPARTECA Plus’ that would 
leave the Pacific island countries outside the 
world economy.
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An update on the revenue structure 
of the Pacific island countries
Updated and revised figures are available 
for the consolidated revenue structure of 
the Pacific island countries for the years 
2008 and 2009 (Table 1) (2008 figures are in 
brackets). The table presents total govern-
ment revenue and grants as percentages 
of GDP and customs revenue and revenue 
raised from a VAT—or similar consumption 
tax, if in place—as shares of total revenue 
and grants. In addition, the table shows the 
average applied tariff rates. Total revenue 
and grants as a percentage of GDP ranges 
widely between 27 per cent for Vanuatu and 
almost 100 per cent for Nauru. For most 
Pacific island countries, however, the share 
of revenue and grants as a percentage of 
GDP is between 30 and 38 per cent.
The table shows that tariff revenue 
remains an important source of government 
revenue. For some countries, however, 
the updated figures show a movement 
away from taxes on international trade as 
a revenue base. This trend is underpinned 
by the fall in average applied tariff rates, for 
which the Pacific island countries should be 
congratulated.
Although the data indicate a decline in 
VAT revenue as a percentage of total rev-
enue and grants for some countries, for most 
of them it remains constant. The decline is 
likely to be an adverse outcome resulting 
from the global economic crisis. For those 
countries where the VAT has declined, 
such as Tonga or Vanuatu, budgetary fore-
casts and forecasts from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for 2010 indicate a 
recovery to 2008 levels.
In comparison with 2008, Niue and 
Nauru had the largest movements in 
revenue and grants as a percentage of 
GDP. In 2009, Niue introduced the Niue 
Consumption Tax (NCT)—a consumption 
tax of 12.5 per cent. This tax was adopted in 
accordance with the country’s preparations 
for trade liberalisation with other Pacific 
island countries under the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) and 
with Australia and New Zealand under 
PACER, and as a response to Niue’s continu-
ing reductions in applied tariffs. With some 
exceptions, such as alcohol and fuel, Niue 
reduced its applied tariffs to zero. Early 
results of income generated from the NCT 
indicate an above-estimate out-turn of 2.3 
per cent of total revenue and grants. This, 
as well as the expected demand impact 
from lower-priced products, led to an 
increase in total tax revenues. According to 
recent budget documents, this increase was 
offset by a reduction in donor grants. Thus, 
revenue and grants declined from 95.5 per 
cent in 2008 to 71.3 per cent in 2009. 
Another Pacific island country at the 
forefront of tax reform is Tuvalu, which 
recently introduced a 3 per cent consump-
tion tax. At this early stage, the tax applies 
to all imports as well as companies with 
high turnover. It is planned to increase the 
tax rate gradually to 10 per cent to offset 
tariff and sales tax cuts. Additionally, the 
threshold will be lowered as tariffs fall to 
broaden the tax base. Revenue estimates for 
the consumption tax are not yet available.
Niue and Tuvalu should be congratulated 
for the introduction of consumption taxes. 
More importantly, their moves show that it 
is possible to reduce dependency on highly 
resource use-distorting trade taxes without 
adverse impacts on government revenues.
As mentioned above, between 2008 and 
2009, Nauru also recorded large changes 
in government revenues and grants as a 
percentage of GDP. The share fell from 
almost 120 per cent to less than 100 per cent. 
According to Nauru’s budgetary figures for 
2010, the reasons for the decline are lower 
donor grants and less revenue generated 
from fisheries.
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For most of the Pacific island countries, 
however, revenues and grants as a percent-
age of GDP remained constant; for some 
there was a minor decline, which was likely 
to have been an adverse effect of the global 
financial crisis. The cuts in average applied 
tariffs helped to reduce this adverse result 
due to the impact of the lower prices on 
demand.
According to the International Trade 
Centre (2010), Fiji, Solomon Islands, Tonga 
and Vanuatu are at the forefront of applied 
tariff cuts. Fiji’s applied tariffs were reduced 
from almost 40 per cent in 2008 to less than 
15 per cent in 2009. Interestingly, the tariff 
reductions did not show up as reductions in 
customs revenue as a share of total revenue 
and grants.
For the Solomon Islands, the slight 
reduction in applied tariffs from 13 per cent 
to about 10 per cent resulted in a minor 
decline in revenues generated from customs. 
Customs revenue as a percentage of total 
revenue and grants fell from 24.7 per cent in 
2008 to 22.5 per cent in 2009. Tonga’s applied 
tariffs declined from 24 per cent in 2008 to 
about 7.6 per cent in 2009. Not surprisingly, 
this led to a large fall in the share of customs 
revenue in total revenue and grants—from 
23.5 per cent to 8.1 per cent. According to 
the Asian Development Bank’s Outlook 2010 
(ADB 2010b), Tonga’s merchandise imports 
are estimated to have declined by 5 per 
cent in 2009. In combination with Tonga’s 
projected negative 0.4 per cent GDP growth 
and the decline in remittances due to the 
global financial crisis, the decline in imports 
would explain Tonga’s reduced VAT collec-
tion. According to budgetary projections, 
the consumption tax outcome declined from 
34.7 per cent in 2008 to only 23.4 per cent in 
2009. Total revenue as a percentage of GDP, 
however, remained constant.
Average applied tariffs in Vanuatu 
declined from more than 25 per cent to 
about 15 per cent between 2008 and 2009. 
Vanuatu’s revenue and grants as a per-
centage of GDP and its customs and VAT 
as percentages of total revenue remained 
almost unchanged.
These updated and revised figures 
underline the suggestion in my earlier 
article that the potential tariff revenue losses 
as a result of a PACER Plus will continue to 
decline in significance. Further, if the Pacific 
island countries continue to reform their 
revenue structures wisely by implementing 
a VAT in combination with an excise tax 
on ‘sinful’ goods, such as has been done 
by Niue, tariff revenue losses can be offset 
while serving a social agenda.
Non-tariff barriers to trade and 
the importance of a reciprocal 
PACER Plus
With their ‘SPARTECA Plus’ alternative, 
Penjueli and Morgan (2010) show that they 
do not understand the problems that the 
Pacific island countries face—nor do they 
comprehend the benefits and opportunities 
a preferential trade agreement with Austral-
ia and New Zealand offers. A ‘SPARTECA 
Plus’ deal would mean a continuation of 
the failed strategies and policies of the non-
reciprocal trading arrangements of the past. 
Not only would it contravene WTO rules, 
according to Article XXIV GATT and Article 
V GATS, it would also place obstacles in the 
way of the Pacific island countries’ integra-
tion into the world economy and ignore the 
welfare losses being experienced by Pacific 
island consumers.
Erasmus (2010) provides an interest-
ing discussion on non-reciprocal trading 
agreements for developing countries and 
why it is necessary for developing coun-
tries to sign up to regional or free-trade 
agreements. Erasmus argues that many 
developing countries have been trapped 
in non-reciprocal preferential trading 
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arrangements that did not solve problems 
such as their marginalisation from global 
markets. Furthermore, such arrangements 
have often led to failure in implementing 
domestic reforms. Legal arrangements and 
structural conditions have been created 
that work against the developing coun-
tries’ integration into the global economy. 
Penjueli and Morgan (2010) and Morgan 
(2009) acknowledge that this is the case 
for the Pacific island region by asking for 
‘improved’ rules of origin for the island 
nations as well as industrial-market access 
through the removal of quarantine barriers. 
How this would help the Pacific island 
countries become competitive in world 
markets remains unanswered. All that it 
would do is create additional economic fric-
tions. Instead of ‘improved’ rules of origin 
and lowering the quarantine barriers facing 
the Pacific island countries,1 they should 
implement domestic reforms targeted at 
meeting international standards.
As noted by Erasmus (2010), it is 
common knowledge that non-reciprocal 
preferential trade agreements between 
developing and industrialised countries 
have resulted in adverse effects for the 
developing-country partner and have 
not led to economic progress. Instead of 
trade creation and economic growth, trade 
diversification took place. The developing 
countries focused their resources on the 
sectors granted preferential market access 
by subsidising their mostly inefficient pro-
duction, instead of implementing necessary 
reforms for an internationally competitive 
market structure. With PACER Plus, the 
Pacific island countries have an opportunity 
to achieve gradual integration into the 
global economy by gradually lowering their 
tariff and non-tariff barriers and reform-
ing their markets accordingly. Unilateral 
liberalisation with the rest of the world 
would be the ideal. With a preferential trade 
agreement such as PACER Plus there is still 
the possibility of some trade diversion; but, 
given the relatively large size of Australia 
and New Zealand and the fact that their 
trade barriers are at low levels, trade diver-
sion should be small.
Penjueli and Morgan’s ‘SPARTECA 
Plus’ suggestion indirectly raises the 
important question of how to deal with non-
tariff barriers to trade, which are at least as 
important as tariffs; however, they are very 
often downplayed or even ignored.
Non-tariff barriers to trade (NTBs) 
are defined as any measure other than 
tariffs that restricts or disturbs trade among 
countries. There are five major categories: 1) 
quantitative restrictions and similar specific 
limitations (mostly implemented through 
import and export quotas and licences); 
2) customs procedures and administrative 
practices (customs surcharges, classification 
and classification and clearance proce-
dures); 3) non-tariff charges and related 
policies (sales and consumption taxes and 
border tax adjustments, anti-dumping and 
countervailing measures, rules of origin); 4) 
government participation in trade, restric-
tive practices and general policies (export 
subsidies and promotion, tax exemptions); 
and 5) technical barriers to trade (‘standards 
and regulations adopted by countries to 
meet the needs of the worldwide increasing 
demand for safe and high-quality products’ 
[World Trade Organization, 2008, www.
wto.org], including quality standards such 
as health and sanitary regulations, safety 
and industrial standards and regulations, 
packaging and labelling, and advertising 
and marketing regulations).
The first and fourth categories create 
resource allocation distortions similar to 
those created by tariff barriers. The other 
three categories essentially cause obstacles 
to trade when they vary among countries. 
For example, differences in customs classifi-
cations and procedures lead to disturbances 
in the form of time and cost inefficiencies of 
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In their Box 1, ‘Introducing a VAT to replace tariff 
revenue: lessons from Samoa and Tonga’, Penjueli 
and Morgan (2010) argue that Samoa and Tonga 
have had negative experiences from the introduction 
of a value-added goods and services tax (VAGST) 
and a consumption tax, respectively. The authors 
claim that the implementation of the taxes ‘has 
been difficult and raises serious questions about the 
ability of both countries to respond to future revenue 
losses under PACER Plus’. According to Penjueli 
and Morgan, ‘Samoa has struggled to maintain 
the revenue needed to pay for essential services 
and raised the VAGST twice in the past decade to 
meet its budgetary needs’. Furthermore, due to the 
reduction of tariffs and the implementation of a 
VAGST, Samoa had to ‘cut 8 per cent and 14.9 per 
cent, respectively, from [its] education and health 
budget’ as the country ‘continues to struggle to pay 
for social services and infrastructure projects’.
In regard to Tonga, the authors state that the 
country faces a dramatic downturn in government 
revenue due to its implementation of the Tonga 
Consumption Tax (TCT) and a reduction in tariffs 
in 2008–09. To blame the shortfall of revenue on the 
tariff reduction and implementation of the TCT is 
not valid. As noted earlier, the shortfall is due mostly 
to the negative impact of the global financial crisis, 
including lower remittances, and the reduction in 
imports.
It is correct that the implementation of the VAGST in 
Samoa and the TCT in Tonga was not easy. Is it ever 
easy to introduce a major policy change, especially 
a new tax? The countries should be praised for 
moving away from tariff revenue dependency. 
Also, adjusting the consumption tax or VAGST 
rate parallel to a reduction in tariffs is good policy 
and has little to do with a ‘struggle to pay for social 
services’.
How ‘bad’, however, is the situation in these 
countries since the reduction in tariffs and the 
introduction of a consumption tax/VAT? The 
following figures present an overview of total 
government revenue as well as revenue collected 
from taxes on international trade and from VAT/
consumption tax.
For Tonga, there is no evidence of a decline in 
government revenue since Tonga lowered its 
applied tariff revenues (Figure 1). Indeed, the figure 
indicates the opposite. Since 2003, when Tonga 
implemented its TCT to offset the revenue lost 
from the reduced tariffs, Tonga’s total government 
revenues have increased from about P100 million to 
more than P200 million in 2009. The outcome of the 
TCT was a success, too. Even though the revenue 
generated from the TCT declined slightly in 2007 
and 2009, total revenue from these taxes has now 
more than offset the loss in tariff revenue.
For Samoa, there is a similar story. Samoa 
implemented its VAGST in 1994 as part of its 
commitment to the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to lower tariffs. It is clear that since then, 
revenue from taxes on international trade has fallen 
(Figure 2). Income from the VAGST has increased 
from less than T10 million in 1994 to more than T110 
million in 2009. In the same period, total government 
revenue has increased from less than T200 million 
to more than T500 million and VAGST revenue 
increases have more than offset the loss due to the 
reduction in applied tariffs.
For Vanuatu, the picture is not as clear, due mainly 
to the fact that the country has not lowered its 
applied tariffs as much as anticipated. Nevertheless, 
since Vanuatu reduced its tariffs, total government 
revenues have increased greatly (Figure 3).
Mauritius implemented a VAT in 1998 to replace its 
sales tax, which suffered from tax base erosion due 
to misuse of exemptions. The VAT was also set up 
to compensate for the revenue loss from a gradual 
reduction in tariffs. The VAT did exactly that (Figure 
4). As Mauritius lowered its tariffs gradually, the 
increase in imports due to the lower tariffs led to an 
increase in VAT revenue. In 2007, Mauritius cut its 
applied tariffs sharply, leading to a fall in revenue 
from taxes on international trade. Nevertheless, 
despite the arguments of those who anticipated a 
collapse in revenues, there was a huge increase.
These data show that, contrary to the arguments 
of Penjueli and Morgan that small Pacific 
island countries will not be able to manage 
trade liberalisation and will face serious revenue 
consequences, there is no evidence to support such 
a scenario. Instead, we see the developments that 
economic theory predicts: a lowering of tariffs 
leads to lower prices, higher-quality products and 
increased purchasing power, which leads in turn 
to greater turnover and higher domestic tax and 
non-tax revenues.
Instead of unnecessarily raising false alarm about 
the negative impact on government income from 
the implementation of a consumption tax to offset 
lower tariff revenues, the focus should be on 
better management of government spending. In 
many cases, government expenditures have been 
increasing more than revenues. Leaving aside short-
term needs for fiscal stimulus in the face of the global 
economic crisis, the Pacific island countries must 
reform and downsize loss-making government 
enterprises that are a burden on the economy. This 
would be something positive for the welfare of 
their citizens.
Box 1 Introducing a VAT to replace tariff revenue: lessons from Samoa, Tonga, 
Vanuatu and Mauritius
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Figure 1 Revenue developments in Tonga, 1995–2010 (P million)
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Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010a. International Finance Statistics (IFS) 2009, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; Government of Tonga, 2010. Budget Statement for Year Ending 30th June 2010, 
Government of Tonga, Nuku’alofa.
Figure 2 Revenue developments in Samoa, 1994–2010 (T million)
1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
m
ill
io
n 
ta
la
Government revenue
Trade tax
VAT
Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010a. International Finance Statistics (IFS) 2009, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; Central Bank of Samoa, 2010. 2009 Annual Report, Central Bank of Samoa, 
Apia. Central Bank of Samoa, 2010a. Annual Reports 2002–2009, Central Bank of Samoa, Government of 
Samoa, Apia. Available from http://www.cbs.gov.ws/publications/reports/ann/index.html; Central Bank of 
Samoa, 2010b. Quarterly Bulletins, Central Bank of Samoa, Government of Samoa, Apia. Available from http://
www.cbs.gov.ws/publications/reports/qbull/index.html; Government of Samoa, 2009a. Budget Address 
2009/2010, Government of Samoa, Apia; Government of Samoa, 2009b. Fiscal strategy statement, Budget 
2009/2010, Government of Samoa, Apia; Government of Samoa, 2009c. Parliamentary Paper 2008/2009 No. 2, 
Government of Samoa, Apia; Government of Samoa, 2010a. Budget Address 2010/2011, Government of Samoa, 
Apia; Government of Samoa, 2010b. Fiscal strategy statement, Budget 2010/2011, Government of Samoa, Apia; 
Government of Samoa, 2010c. Parliamentary Paper 2010/2011 No. 2, Government of Samoa, Apia; Samoa 
Statistics Department, 2010. Economic Indicators 2010, Ministry of Finance, Government of Samoa, Apia. Available 
from: http://www.spc.int/prism/wstest/about_us/contact.htm
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Figure 3 Revenue developments in Vanuatu, 1994–2009 (V million)
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Sources: International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010a. International Finance Statistics (IFS) 2009, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC; Vanuatu National Statistics Office (VNSO), 2010. Economic Statistics, Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Management, Government of Vanuatu, Port Vila. Available from http://www.spc.
int/PRISM/country/vu/stats/ECONOMIC/ecoindex.htm; Reserve Bank of Vanuatu, 2010. Quarterly Economic 
Reviews 2003–2010, Government of Vanuatu, Port Vila. Available from http://www.rbv.gov.vu/QtrEconomic.
htm; Government of Vanuatu, 2010. Budget 2010, Government of Vanuatu, Port Vila. Available from http://
www.governmentofvanuatu.gov.vu/documents/category/20-2010-budget.html.
Figure 4 Revenue developments in Mauritius, 1994–2010 (R million)
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reclassification or information costs about 
the different classification systems (for 
example, SITC versus HS classification).2 
Furthermore, disturbances of trade flows 
can occur when the customs administration 
is inefficient—for example, due to a lack of 
capacity. NTBs can also be used deliber-
ately as instruments of protectionism. For 
example, countries can support domestic 
industries by slowing customs procedures 
or increasing the bureaucratic burden by 
increasing regulations.
The most widely used NTBs for pur-
poses of protection are the technical barriers 
to trade. Unnecessarily high standards and 
regulations disturb trade flows and support 
domestic industries. Even if the government 
does not favour protectionism, varying 
standards among countries make trade 
much more difficult for producers, export-
ers and importers. In the end, all of these 
barriers increase the costs of trade, which 
are eventually borne by consumers.
How do the Pacific islands fare in 
terms of non-tariff barriers to trade?
Measuring the impact of NTBs is difficult; 
however, the World Bank’s annual Doing 
Business reports offer one approach to the 
measurement of the effects of NTBs by 
comparing regulations across 183 countries. 
For example, the category ‘trading across 
borders’ provides an overview of the costs 
of regulations affecting trade. The reports 
compile the procedural requirements for 
trading a standardised cargo of goods, 
whereby every official procedure required 
has been recorded. Further, the time taken 
and the costs for completion of the process-
ing of the cargo are reported (for more detail, 
see doingbusiness.org).
The World Bank’s ‘trading across 
borders’ indicators for the Pacific island 
countries and Australia, Hong Kong, 
Mauritius, New Zealand and Singapore 
are summarised (Table 2). It can be seen 
that the bureaucratic burden in the form 
of documentation and the time to trade are 
major constraints on trade in the Pacific. 
This is an indication that Pacific island 
countries have not managed to integrate 
into the international economic system yet, 
as they have remained outside due to their 
special preferential trading arrangements 
for market access to Australia, New Zea-
land, the European Union and the United 
States. Recently, Tonga has made progress 
by reducing the number of documents 
required to trade. On the other hand, Fiji—
one of the more developed countries in the 
Pacific—still requires the processing of 13 
documents in order for trade to take place.
Comparative advantage and the 
importance of a services trade 
chapter
Penjueli and Morgan (2010) urge Pacific 
island countries not to consider the inclu-
sion of a services trade chapter in PACER 
Plus, as it would not bring additional 
benefits to their comparative advantage 
in the services sector—identified as labour 
mobility. Instead, ‘they could simply end 
up with what they already have’. Again, 
the authors demonstrate that they do not 
understand the importance of trade liber-
alisation and the benefits that services trade 
liberalisation can bring.
As noted previously, the services-trade 
liberalisation that has recently taken place in 
Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and 
Vanuatu in aviation and telecommunica-
tions has brought huge welfare benefits in 
the form of lower prices and better-quality 
services, as well as resulting in significant 
GDP growth and employment. Even serv-
ices such as health and education, which are 
probably not the main priorities of services-
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trade liberalisation, can benefit from similar 
liberalisation movements. Opponents of 
free trade will argue that all services-trade 
liberalisation does is lower consumer 
benefits, increase prices and increase unem-
ployment by destroying government-run 
entities. Indeed, this argument is true in 
part. Yes, services-trade liberalisation can 
displace government-run enterprises that 
are inefficient and mismanaged, have high 
costs and deliver low-quality services. What 
we have seen from telecommunications 
liberalisation in the Pacific, however, is that 
the government enterprises have remained 
in business and have become much more 
efficient and are offering competition to the 
private sector entrant in the form of lower 
prices and better-quality services.
Should Pacific island countries unwind 
liberalisation in these areas? How would 
the opponents of liberalisation explain such 
a backward move to the many beneficiar-
ies, such as, for example, those who have 
obtained employment in the expanded tour-
ism sectors and those who are benefiting from 
lower international travel costs, which enable 
them to afford to visit their relatives overseas 
or for their overseas relatives to travel back 
home? Similarly, what explanation could be 
offered to those islanders who work for the 
many Vodafone and Digicel shops that have 
opened up throughout the Pacific?
Table 2 Costs of trading across borders
Country Imports Exports
Cost  
(US$)
Documents 
(no.)
Time  
(days)
Cost  
(US$)
Documents 
(no.)
Time  
(days)
Fiji 630 13 24 654 13 24
Federated States of Micronesia 1,295 3 30 1,295 6 30
Kiribati 1,070 7 21 1,070 6 21
Palau 1,132 10 33 1,190 6 29
Papua New Guinea 722 9 29 664 7 26
Republic of Marshall Islands 945 5 33 945 5 21
Samoa 848 7 31 820 7 27
Solomon Islands 1,237 4 21 1,023 7 24
Timor-Leste 1,015 7 26 1,010 6 25
Tonga 725 6 24 650 7 19
Vanuatu 1,392 9 30 1,497 7 26
Australia 1,119 5 8 1,060 6 9
Hong Kong 583 4 5 625 4 6
Mauritius 689 6 14 737 5 14
New Zealand 850 5 9 868 7 10
Singapore 439 4 3 456 4 5
Notes: Cost is measured as the fees levied on a 6-metre container in US dollars, including all fees associated 
with completing the export/import procedures (documents, handling charges, inland transfers). Tariffs or taxes 
on trade are not included. Documents comprise all documents required to export or import, including bank 
documents, customs classification and licences for import/export. The time is recorded as the calendar days 
required for the processing of imports and exports. 
Source: World Bank, 2010. Doing Business 2010, The World Bank, Washington, DC.
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Conclusion
Pacific island countries should sign a 
PACER Plus agreement with Australia and 
New Zealand to assist them to overcome 
the major obstacles to economic growth 
currently faced in the form of tariffs and 
NTBs and to enjoy the benefits that integra-
tion with the globalised world offers. Tariff 
revenue loss does not have to be a major 
issue if Pacific island countries reform their 
revenue and tax systems in an appropriate 
manner, such as by implementing a VAT or 
a similar consumption tax, in addition to 
excise taxes on ‘sinful’ goods.
Recent figures indicate that tariff rev-
enues are still an important component of 
total government revenues in most Pacific 
island countries, although the data also 
show that the Pacific islands are moving 
away from dependence on tariff revenue. 
Pacific island governments should be con-
gratulated for these steps; however, more 
still needs to be done.
What is often misunderstood by many 
NGOs, such as PANG (2009), is that trade 
liberalisation is about more than tariff 
revenue reductions. Even though tariff rev-
enues play an important role, other obstacles 
to trade such as NTBs must be recognised 
when discussing trade liberalisation. Here, 
Pacific island countries can benefit from 
regional trade arrangements by reducing 
and eliminating NTBs such as sanitary and 
phytosanitary and quarantine limitations, 
and inefficient customs administrations and 
processes. Furthermore, Pacific island coun-
tries should seriously consider signing up 
for services and FDI chapters in PACER Plus 
to benefit fully from international trade and 
to create an investor-friendly environment, 
which is key to a successful future.
Services-trade liberalisation is just one 
part of a successful liberalisation story. 
The importance of including a foreign 
direct investment (FDI) chapter in PACER 
Plus also needs to be emphasised. FDI 
liberalisation is crucial to the successful and 
sustainable development of Pacific island 
countries. As noted earlier, Mauritius is an 
example of how a country can liberalise 
its key sectors and become an internation-
ally competitive participant in the world 
economy. Mauritius has liberalised several 
service sectors, especially tourism, telecom-
munications and financial services. The 
direct benefits of lower-cost, higher-quality 
services, as well as the spill-over effects 
on their manufacturing and agricultural 
sectors, have been significant. It could be 
argued that there is more that can be done; 
however, the doomsday scenarios forecast 
for Mauritius did not even come close to 
occurring.
For the Pacific island countries, there is 
a lot of work to be done. By reforming their 
markets wisely, however, and with a view 
to becoming internationally competitive, 
Pacific island countries do not have to fear 
gradual trade liberalisation. Therefore, 
Pacific island countries would do well to 
move away from tariff revenue dependency, 
by implementing long-overdue, compre-
hensive domestic reforms. Furthermore, 
international agencies such as the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the ADB and the United Nations and 
their major industrialised trading partners, 
Australia, New Zealand, the European 
Union and the United States, understand 
the issues Pacific island countries are facing. 
Thus, Pacific island countries should ask 
these organisations and countries for techni-
cal assistance.
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Notes
1 Pacific island countries certainly need 
assistance in overcoming quarantine 
barriers, especially those facing potential 
agricultural exports. This should be done, 
however, through assisting them to raise 
their production standards to legitimate 
international levels or through help in 
reducing illegitimate quarantine barriers.
2 SITC stands for Standard International Trade 
Classification; HS is the Harmonised System 
of trade classification.
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